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Reorganizations, Sales, and the Changing
Face of Restructuring in Canada:
Quantitative Outcomes of 2012 and 2013
CCAA Proceedings

This article examines quantitative data on the outcomes of proceedings under
the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), Canada’s principal statute
for resolving large, complex corporate insolvencies. In particular, this article
compares the durations, direct costs, and returns to different classes of creditors
generated by traditional reorganizations under the CCAA and by “liquidating
CCAAs”—that is, proceedings in which the insolvent debtor sells substantially
all of its assets rather than reorganizing itself. The article makes a number of
contributions to the existing scholarship. Firstly, quantitative data on CCAA
proceedings are rare. The data examined here, collected by the author from
proceedings initiated in 2012 and 2013, provide novel insights into the functioning
of the CCAA. Secondly, the article questions much of the conventional wisdom
surrounding liquidating CCAAs based upon the data, suggesting that further
study is required. Thirdly, the article proposes reforms to address the problems
raised by liquidating CCAAs.

Le présent article examine des données quantitatives sur l’issue des procédures
intentées en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des
compagnies (LACC), la principale loi canadienne visant à régler les dossiers
complexes et importants d’insolvabilité des entreprises. En particulier, l’article
compare les durées, les coûts directs et le rendement pour différentes catégories
de créanciers générés par les réorganisations traditionnelles en vertu de la LACC
et par les « liquidations en vertu de la LACC »—c’est-à-dire les procédures
dans lesquelles le débiteur insolvable vend la quasi-totalité de ses actifs plutôt
que de se réorganiser. L’article fait un certain nombre de contributions au
bagage de connaissances existant. Premièrement, les données quantitatives
sur les procédures en vertu de la LACC sont rares. Les données examinées
ici, recueillies par l’auteur dans le cadre de procédures entamées en 2012 et
2013, fournissent de nouvelles perspectives sur le fonctionnement de la LACC.
Deuxièmement, l’article remet en question une grande partie de la sagesse
conventionnelle entourant les liquidations en vertu de la LACC fondée sur les
données, ce qui donne à penser qu’une étude plus approfondie est nécessaire.
Troisièmement, l’article propose des réformes pour régler les problèmes soulevés
par les liquidations.

*
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Introduction
The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act1 is the principal legal
mechanism for restructuring large, insolvent corporations in Canada.2
Historically, CCAA restructurings involved lengthy negotiations among
the creditors and other stakeholders of insolvent debtors, culminating in
a formal restructuring plan on which the creditors would vote. In most
1.
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 [CCAA].
2.
The terms “company,” “corporation,” and “entity” are used interchangeably throughout this
article. Pursuant to section 3(1) of the Act, any “debtor company” or af¿liated debtor companies
having at least $5 million in debt can apply for CCAA protection. Although the de¿nition of “debtor
company” in section 2(1) does not expressly include entities such as partnerships, the courts have
used their inherent jurisdiction to extend protection to partnerships that are part of corporate groups
in CCAA proceedings. See e.g. Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd, [1993] OJ No 14, 9 BLR (2d) 275
(ONSC); Re Canwest Global Communications Corp, [2009] OJ No 4286, 2009 CanLII 55114 (ONSC)
[Re Canwest]; Re Calpine Energy Canada Ltd 2006 ABQB 153.
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cases, the aim was to restore the debtor to pro¿tability and continue
operating. More recently, the emphasis of most CCAA proceedings has
shifted away from the objective of reorganizing the debtor as such toward
the sale of the debtor’s assets, whether piecemeal or on a going concern
basis. These “liquidating CCAAs” are typically planned before the debtor
company has applied for CCAA protection. Once CCAA protection is
granted, an abridged process is carried out in which the debtor’s assets are
marketed and sold. Often, there is either no formal plan of arrangement
or the plan simply provides for the distribution of the sale proceeds to the
debtor’s creditors. In this way, the CCAA is said to have evolved into a
more Àexible mechanism that permits both traditional reorganizations and
sales of substantially all the assets of insolvent debtor companies.3
Somewhere amidst this evolution in CCAA law, important questions
have been left unanswered. Proponents of liquidating CCAAs maintain that
sales generate better returns for creditors compared with reorganizations
while still preserving the debtor’s underlying business in many cases,
thereby saving jobs and avoiding many of the negative consequences of
a liquidation in bankruptcy.4 Central to this view of liquidating CCAAs is
the implication that any harm to junior creditors that might result from
the abridged process is minimal and, in any event, is outweighed by the
supposed bene¿ts of the quick sale. Thus far, however, there has been
no empirical evidence presented to support such assertions. The reality
is that, despite years of debate over the propriety of liquidating CCAAs,
there remains a paucity of data on the outcomes of CCAA proceedings.
Liquidating CCAAs and their most recent derivative, pre-packaged sales
or “pre-packs,” continue to proliferate even though empirical evidence of
their supposed bene¿ts is noticeably absent from the jurisprudence and
the scholarship.5
This article examines the quantitative outcomes of CCAA proceedings
commenced between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2013. Speci¿cally,
this article compares data on the duration, costs, and outcomes of CCAA
sales and full reorganizations. Necessarily, the decision to pursue any given
restructuring option consigns “all other possible outcomes…to the realm
3.
Re 8640025 Canada Inc, 2018 BCCA 93 at para 45 [8640025 Canada].
4.
Anthony Duggan et al, Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Cases, Text and Materials,
3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2015) at 614.
5.
See Tushara Weerasooriya et al, “Pre-Packs under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act:
Has the Push for Ef¿ciency Undermined Fairness?” in Janis P Sarra & Honourable Barbara Romaine,
eds, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) 347: “further
empirical analysis is required in order to validate and better understand the bene¿ts of pre-packaged
transactions” (ibid at 349) (by way of background, in a pre-pack, the debtor negotiates the terms of the
sale prior to ¿ling for CCAA protection).
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of the hypothetical.”6 Accordingly, the key data points examined in this
article serve as proxies for evaluating the relative success of liquidating
CCAAs compared with full reorganization proceedings.
Part I below provides an overview of the CCAA regime and discusses
the emergence of liquidating CCAAs and their implications. Part II
describes the methodology of the quantitative study undertaken here and
the results, asking whether the data support assertions that liquidating
CCAAs are indeed faster, cheaper and more likely to maximize value for
creditors than full reorganizations. Part III considers the implications of
the quantitative results presented here and proposes reforms of the CCAA
regime.
I. Overview of Canadian restructuring law
The CCAA is the primary mechanism for resolving large, complex
corporate insolvencies in Canada. Alternatively, insolvent corporations
may ¿le a commercial proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act.7 While the BIA commercial proposal process is popular with small
and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs), it is rarely used by large corporations
or corporate groups. Accordingly, there are typically many more BIA
proposals than CCAA proceedings annually, but the average size of the
debtor corporations is much higher in CCAA proceedings. For example,
the Of¿ce of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada (OSB) reported
that there were 32 CCAA proceedings initiated in 2013, compared with
754 commercial proposal proceedings; however, the average total value
of assets in BIA proposals was $875,649, compared with $105,234,468 in
CCAA proceedings.8
There are several reasons why the CCAA is the preferred tool for large,
complex restructurings. Firstly, the BIA prescribes various strict deadlines
that a debtor must meet in order to remain under court protection.9 In
6.
Richard B Jones, “The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law” in
Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005 (Toronto: Carswell, 2006) 481 at 519.
7.
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, Part III, Division I [BIA].
8.
See Roderick J Wood, “Receiverships in Canada: Myth and Reality” (2017) 80:1 Sask L Rev 231
at 243-245, citing Canada, Of¿ce of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, CCAA Statistics in Canada:
Fourth Quarter of 2015 (Ottawa: Industry Canada), online: <publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.507922/
publication.html> [perma.cc/F45N-WH3C]. In fact, the average value for CCAA companies in 2013
was low—the average value was $156,559,320 in 2014 and $579,444,450 in 2015. This Àuctuation
may be explained, in part, by the relatively small number of cases in each year, such that a few very
large insolvencies skew the average. Nonetheless, these average values show that the CCAA tends to
be used by only the largest companies.
9.
See e.g. BIA, supra note 7 s 50.4(2)(b), which requires the debtor to ¿le a cash Àow statement
within 10 days of ¿ling its notice of intention to ¿le a proposal, and s 50.4(8), which provides that
the debtor must ¿le its proposal within 30 days from the notice date, failing which the debtor will be
assigned to bankruptcy automatically.
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contrast, the CCAA has no hard deadlines, and the CCAA process can be
extended by court order for as long as may be necessary to facilitate the
restructuring. Secondly, if the creditors vote against a commercial proposal
under the BIA, the debtor is automatically assigned into bankruptcy.10
Under the CCAA, meanwhile, a debtor whose creditors have rejected its
restructuring plan may remain under court protection, and may continue
negotiating with its creditors with a view to revising its plan. Thirdly, the
broad discretion granted to CCAA judges also makes the CCAA a more
Àexible restructuring tool than the BIA. As the Supreme Court of Canada
explained in Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General),11 the
CCAA is a relatively short statute which empowers supervising judges
to grant orders approving restructuring steps that may not be speci¿cally
authorized in the explicit language of the Act:12
CCAA decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction.
The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts
under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as “the hothouse of
real-time litigation” has been the primary method by which the CCAA
has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and
social needs.13

The broad discretion granted to CCAA judges corresponds with the
broad remedial purposes of the Act, namely, to permit insolvent debtors
“to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and
economic costs of liquidating [their] assets.”14 In pursuing these objectives,
courts must give “an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation” to
the Act’s provisions.15 The “broad reading of CCAA authority developed by
the jurisprudence” has been recognized by Parliament in section 11 of the
Act, which empowers the CCAA court to “make any order that it considers
appropriate in the circumstances.”16 The structure of the CCAA—which
“is geared towards the development of a plan of arrangement that will be
presented before the creditors” for a vote—reÀects the Act’s purpose of

10. Ibid s 61(2)(b).
11. Century Services Inc v Canada (AG), 2010 SCC 60 [Century Services].
12. Ibid at para 58.
13. Jones, supra note 6 at 484.
14. Century Services, supra note 11 at para 16.
15. Ibid at para 65.
16. Ibid at para 68.
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facilitating traditional reorganizations, in which creditors negotiate among
themselves over the fate of the insolvent debtor company.17
More recently, the CCAA jurisprudence has shifted to recognize that,
in addition to a traditional reorganization, it is also possible to preserve
the value of an insolvent enterprise through a going concern sale of
the underlying business. However, given the CCAA’s structure as a
reorganization statute, the emergence of liquidating CCAAs has given rise
to several unresolved issues. In particular, as a general matter, sales can
also be carried out through court-appointed receivership proceedings and
bankruptcy proceedings under the BIA. Accordingly, it is important to ask
why many debtors seek to sell their assets through more expensive CCAA
proceedings than through the more obvious and cost-effective alternatives.
The shift toward sales and away from reorganizations is one of the
more remarkable judicially-driven “evolutions” of the CCAA because
reorganization and liquidation are fundamentally different processes.18
At the same time, the use of other mechanisms to restructure or liquidate
the assets of debtor companies, such as court-appointed receivers, has all
but disappeared for large companies. Several reasons may explain this
shift away from receiverships, including, for example, the Àexibility of the
CCAA and the broad powers of the CCAA judge compared with receivers.
Perhaps most importantly, however, successor employer liability is less
of a concern for the debtor company carrying out a liquidating CCAA,
whereas a similar sale through a receivership could attract successor
employer liability for the receiver under provincial labour and employment
laws. As such, since the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2006 decision in TCT
Logistics,19 which held that receivers could be found liable as successor
employers, receiverships have seen a marked decline while CCAA sales
have been on the rise.20
17. Roderick J Wood, “Rescue and Liquidation in Restructuring Law” (2013) 53:3 Can Bus LJ 407
at 410-411. Central to the CCAA’s reorganization purpose was the view, prevalent at the time of its
enactment, that reorganization would preserve going concern value by avoiding the loss of goodwill
and other intangible assets: see Century Services, supra note 11 at para 18.
18. For a further comparison of reorganization and liquidation under the CCAA, see Duggan, supra
note 4 at 612-613; and Alfonso Nocilla, “Is ‘Corporate Rescue’ Working in Canada?” (2013) 53:3 Can
Bus LJ 382; but see 8640025 Canada, supra note 3; see also Arrangement relatif à Bloom Lake, 2017
QCCS 4057: “[t]he Court notes that there is nothing in any way pejorative about qualifying the CCAA
as a liquidating CCAA. That is a legitimate and increasingly frequent use of CCAA proceedings.” (ibid
at para 174) [Bloom Lake].
19. GMAC Commercial Credit Corp—Canada v TCT Logistics Inc, 2006 SCC 35.
20. See David Bish, “The Plight of Receiverships in a CCAA World” (2013) 2 J Insol Inst Can 221
at 232, and Jeffrey C Carhart, “The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in TCT Logistics and the
Future of Receiverships in Canada” (2007) 44:3 Can Bus LJ 376. It should be noted that the shift from
receiverships to CCAA sales is primarily a large company phenomenon, as private and court-appointed
receiverships remain popular tools for smaller companies, see Wood, supra note 8.
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The shift to using the CCAA predominately for sales rather than
reorganizations presents a number of issues. Firstly, although amendments
to the Act in 2009 codi¿ed the court’s authority to approve CCAA sales
under section 36, as I have argued elsewhere, section 36 is deeply
Àawed.21 In adding section 36 to the Act, Parliament seems not to have
fully appreciated the implications of using the CCAA to sell the assets of
insolvent companies wholesale, a process that was previously carried out
in receivership and bankruptcy proceedings. Speci¿cally, Parliament failed
to provide substantive guidance to CCAA judges in determining whether
to approve liquidating CCAAs or even to specify which test courts should
use—although section 36(3) sets out various factors that courts should
consider when asked to approve a sale, these factors overlap signi¿cantly
with the older test for receivership sales set out in Royal Bank v Soundair.22
The result is that courts have taken to applying both tests in many cases,
apparently unsure of which one ought to govern, with some courts stating
that section 36 is not determinative at all.23 In practice, the court will rely
heavily upon the monitor’s opinion in deciding whether to grant the order
authorizing the sale. The deference shown by courts to monitors in CCAA
sales mirrors the deference shown to receivers:
If the court were to reject the recommendations of the Receiver in any
but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish
and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception
of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion
to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the
Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made
upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible
of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by courtappointed receivers.24

21. The amendments were introduced in Bill C-12, An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act, the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter
47 of the Statutes of Canada, 2005, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2007 (assented to 14 December 2007) and
subsequently became An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 of the Statutes of Canada,
2005, SC 2007, c 36.
22. Royal Bank v Soundair, [1991] OJ No 1137, 4 OR (3d) 1 (Ont CA) [Soundair].
23. See Re White Birch Paper Holding Co, 2010 QCCS 4915: “The elements which can be found in
section 36 CCAA are, ¿rst of all, not limitative and secondly need not be all ful¿lled in order to grant
or not grant an order under this section.” (ibid at para 48). For further discussion, see also Alfonso
Nocilla, “Asset Sales Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and the Failure of section 36”
(2012) 52:2 Can Bus LJ 226; Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs—Are We Praying to False
Gods?” in Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2008 (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) 33.
24. Calpine Canada Energy Limited (Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act), 2007 ABQB 49 at
para 52, citing Crown Trust Co v Rosenberg (1986), 60 OR (2d) 87 at 112, 39 DLR (4th) 526 (Ont HC).
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Secondly, whereas the BIA provides a detailed priority ranking
scheme for distributing the proceeds from the sale of the bankrupt’s assets
among its creditors, the CCAA contains no such distribution scheme.25
Accordingly, when a liquidating CCAA concludes, the debtor will
either enter bankruptcy or receivership proceedings for the purposes of
distributing the sale proceeds, or it will ¿le a formal plan of arrangement
under the CCAA for the sole purpose of proposing how to distribute the
proceeds among its creditors. This state of affairs has led the Supreme
Court of Canada to state, in Indalex, that even though a liquidating CCAA
may achieve essentially the same result as a BIA liquidation—a sale of
substantially all of the debtor’s assets—the distribution scheme used in
liquidating CCAAs need not be the same as the scheme set out in the BIA.26
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the interplay between the BIA
and CCAA in these regards is perplexing. In short, it is not at all clear
why functionally equivalent processes under the BIA and CCAA should
yield asymmetrical outcomes for stakeholders. Indeed, the foregoing
statement in Indalex seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier
statements in Century Services. In particular, the Supreme Court stated in
Century Services that: (1) the BIA and CCAA form “part of an integrated
body of insolvency law”; and (2) although the BIA and CCAA contain
different reorganization procedures because “reorganizations of differing
complexity require different legal mechanisms…only one statutory
scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor’s
estate.”27 More recently, the Quebec Superior Court’s decision in Bloom
Lake pointed out the “strange asymmetry”28 that would result if the BIA
scheme of distribution were not applied in liquidating CCAA proceedings:
There is no statutory scheme of distribution under the CCAA because
the CCAA is not intended to be the vehicle for a liquidation of assets and
distribution of the proceeds. The CCAA is intended as a vehicle for the
restructuring of the debtor…
The bottom line is that a liquidating CCAA requires a scheme of
distribution and the only one which makes sense is the scheme of
distribution under the BIA. As a result, and unless there is a contradiction
between the CCAA and the BIA, the BIA scheme of distribution should
apply in a liquidating CCAA.29

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See BIA, supra note 7 s 136.
Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v United Steelworkers, 2013 SCC 6 [Indalex].
Century Services, supra note 11 at para 78.
Bloom Lake, supra note 18 at para 205, citing Century Services, supra note 11 at para 47.
Bloom Lake, supra note 18 at paras 203-208.
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Thus far, these apparently inconsistent approaches to the question of
which distribution scheme ought to apply in liquidating CCAAs remain
unresolved.30
Thirdly, and more generally, important protections available to
stakeholders in full CCAA proceedings may be absent in liquidating
CCAAs. A traditional CCAA process may involve dozens of court
appearances over the course of several months or even years. At each
stage, the supervising judge must review the debtor’s progress towards
developing a viable plan of arrangement that treats all stakeholders fairly.
In a liquidation, the goal is to complete the sale as quickly as possible. In
contrast to full CCAA proceedings, many of the negotiations leading to the
proposed sale may well have occurred prior to the debtor’s CCAA ¿ling
and without the court’s supervision. Those negotiations would include the
senior secured creditors and perhaps a few other key stakeholders, but
would necessarily exclude most of the junior and unsecured creditors, as
well as many other stakeholders. In short, the structure and procedures of
the CCAA are poorly suited to sales and the likely losers in quick sales
are those stakeholders who possess the least amount of leverage vis-à-vis
the debtor and senior creditors.31 While Parliament could certainly address
these de¿ciencies in the structure and procedures of the CCAA to account
for liquidating CCAAs, doing so would require a comprehensive approach
to amending the Act for which Parliament appears to have no appetite.32
In light of the foregoing issues, it is prudent to ask whether the CCAA
is truly the most appropriate mechanism for liquidating CCAAs, and if not,
what can be done to remedy the situation. The answers to these questions
depend, at least in part, upon how liquidating CCAAs are affecting
different types of stakeholders in practice compared with traditional CCAA
proceedings. Yet, as discussed below, the available data on the outcomes
of CCAA proceedings remain scarce.

30. For further discussion, see Alfonso Nocilla & Vern DaRe, “The Trouble with Pre-Packs,” in
Janis P Sarra et al, eds, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2018 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2019)
621.
31. Wood, supra note 17 at 412-415.
32. Historically, such comprehensive attempts at reforming the insolvency regime have been nonstarters in Ottawa. Arguably, the last major attempts at comprehensive reforms occurred in the 1980s,
and all of them ended in failure. Consequently, since that time, successive governments have favoured
a piecemeal approach to insolvency law reform. See Jacob S Ziegel, “The Travails of Bill C-12”
(1983) 8:3 Can Bus LJ 374; Jacob S Ziegel, “Canada’s Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform” (1996),
70:4 Am Bankr LJ 383; Alfonso Nocilla, “The History of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act
and the Future of Restructuring Law in Canada” (2014) 56:1 Can Bus LJ 73.
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II. Quantitative outcomes of 2012 and 2013 CCAA proceedings
1. Methodology
The OSB maintains an online public record of all CCAA proceedings initiated
since 18 September 2009.33 A review of the OSB’s online CCAA records
list identi¿ed 77 separate ¿lings between 1 January 2012 and 31 December
2013. These dates were selected for several reasons. Firstly, cases begun in
2012 and 2013 were almost all likely to have been completed by the time
of this study, permitting collection of all available data on costs, returns
to creditors and duration of proceedings. Secondly, although examining
cases over several years would have been preferable to focusing on only
two years, there were practical limitations to conducting a longer multiyear study. Although 77 CCAA proceedings may seem like a low number,
many proceedings involved joint ¿lings by complex corporate groups. In
addition, as noted earlier, average asset values were signi¿cantly higher
in CCAA proceedings than in other types of insolvency proceedings, such
as BIA commercial proposals. CCAA ¿lings are accordingly complex, and
the 77 proceedings examined from 2012 and 2013 included hundreds of
monitors’ reports, court orders and motion materials, all of which were
reviewed individually in order to manually record the relevant data.34
Document review, manual data extraction and verifying database entries
consumed over 230 hours of research time, or roughly 3 hours per CCAA
proceeding, although actual times per case varied signi¿cantly because
some cases were longer and more complex than others.
A database of CCAA proceedings was created in Excel based on the
OSB’s records. Electronic versions of records of each proceeding were

33. Of¿ce of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, “CCAA Records List,” online: <www.
ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br02281.html> [perma.cc/AB8B-HW6J]. The OSB is required to
collect and maintain this public record pursuant to s 26(1) of the CCAA, which came into force on 18
September 2009.
34. The monitor is an accountant and licensed trustee in bankruptcy appointed at the time of the initial
CCAA order pursuant to section 11.7 of the Act. Although originally a judicial creation, Parliament has
codi¿ed the role and duties of the monitor in the CCAA. As an of¿cer of the court, the monitor is tasked
with various duties under section 23 of the CCAA, including especially the duties to report to the court
on the debtor’s business and affairs, investigate the causes of the debtor’s insolvency, and generally to
assist the debtor in its restructuring and advise the court as to the reasonableness and fairness of any
proposed arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. The monitor owes a ¿duciary duty to the
stakeholders of the insolvent debtor, must act independently, and must treat all parties in the CCAA
proceedings reasonably and fairly. See Winalta Inc (Re), 2011 ABQB 399 at paras 67-77 [Re Winalta].
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then gathered from the websites of the monitors appointed in each case.35
These records included court orders, notices to creditors, and monitors’
reports detailing the progress of each case. The following data were
manually collected and entered into the database, where available:
a. ID Number: Each case was assigned a unique identi¿cation
number. Corporate group ¿lings were treated as a single case/
¿ling because the restructurings of different entities within the
same corporate groups were conducted through collective CCAA
proceedings in each case.
b. Name of company: The name(s) of the entity or entities identi¿ed
in the monitor’s reports.
c. Commencement Date: Date on which CCAA proceedings were
initiated, based on the court order granting CCAA protection.
d. End Date: Date on which the CCAA proceedings terminated,
based on the court order terminating proceedings. For the 10 cases
that remained ongoing at the time that this article was written,
the current date (9 May 2019) was used in order to calculate
duration.36
e. Incorporation Date: Date on which the debtor (for corporate
groups, the parent company) was incorporated, as reported by the
monitor.
f. Industry Sector: Business sector of the debtor, if recorded by the
monitor.
g. Type of Proceeding: Each case was classi¿ed based upon a review
of the monitor’s reports. Cases were classi¿ed as either traditional
restructurings or liquidating CCAAs. Liquidating CCAAs were
further divided into going-concern sales and piecemeal sales.
h. Secured Debt: Total amount of secured debt at the time of ¿ling.
i. Preferred Debt: Total amount of preferred debt at the time of
¿ling.
35. Among its other duties, the monitor in each CCAA proceeding must make its reports and various
other materials, including court orders and motion materials, publicly available on its website. The
OSB’s online CCAA records list includes links to the monitor’s website in each proceeding. However,
as discussed later, monitors’ websites are typically taken down after a period of time has elapsed
following the conclusion of the CCAA process, and accordingly, the relevant documents from each
proceeding are not always readily available.
36. In statistical terms, the durations of the ongoing cases are censored data—they are unknown.
Various statistical methods may need to be applied in order to account for these data and avoid
bias. However, the numbers of cases in the present study are likely too small to model censored
observations. See generally Rizwaan Mokal, Nigel J Balmer & Alfonso Nocilla, “United Kingdom
National Findings” (14 May 2018) at 55, online (pdf): Contractualised Distress Resolution in the
Shadow of the Law <www.codire.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/National-Findings-UK-formattedclean.pdf > [perma.cc/EZV8-YQEV].
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j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.

Unsecured Debt: Total amount of unsecured debt at the time of
¿ling.
Secured Returns: Total returns to secured creditors upon
termination of proceedings.
Preferred Returns: Total returns to preferred creditors upon
termination.
Unsecured Returns: Total returns to unsecured creditors upon
termination.
Total Costs: Total costs incurred by the debtor in the CCAA
process, including monitor’s fees and legal and other professional
expenses.
Name of Monitor and Law Firm: The names of the accounting
¿rm and individual appointed as the debtor’s monitor, as well as
the monitor’s legal counsel.
Province: The province in which proceedings were initiated.

2. Challenges with data collection and cautionary notes
Manual data collection and entry was a time-consuming process.
For several reasons, it was often dif¿cult to collect the relevant data.
Firstly, successive monitors’ reports in each case rarely summarized the
information contained in previous reports. Consequently, each successive
report had to be reviewed in order to identify and manually enter the data.
Secondly, many records were inconsistent both in terms of the data that
they presented and the manner in which they presented it—despite their
general similarities in formatting, monitors’ reports were rarely uniform
across different cases. Thirdly, although monitors are required to maintain
all relevant reports on their websites while the CCAA proceedings are
ongoing, many monitors’ websites become inactive shortly after the
proceedings have concluded. Accordingly, the relevant records could
only be obtained by requesting them from individual accounting ¿rms.
Moreover, records of cases that had concluded several years ago and for
which the monitors’ website had become inactive were often incomplete.
Lastly, it should be noted that there are limits to what can be extrapolated
from examining the data from only two years of CCAA proceedings. In
particular, business cycles in different industries can strongly inÀuence
insolvency ¿lings each year. Even during broad economic downturns, it is
common for insolvency cases to be concentrated in only certain industry
sectors. Consequently, the average size of debtors, types of assets and
duration of proceedings, among things, may vary signi¿cantly depending
on the time period under examination. For example, CCAA cases in
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the early 1990s were dominated by the commercial real estate crash;37
the early 2000s, meanwhile, saw the failures of major technology and
telecommunications ¿rms such as Nortel38 and Canwest.39 Examining
only certain years in isolation may, therefore, may result in bias and limit
the potential to generalize ¿ndings.40 Nonetheless, as discussed below, the
data presented here offer several useful insights.
3. Results
i. Procedures by type, year and province
Of the 33 CCAA proceedings initiated in 2013, 22 were liquidating CCAAs
(67 per cent), 9 were traditional reorganizations (27 per cent), and 2
were terminated shortly after commencement and entered bankruptcy or
receivership (6 per cent). Of the 44 CCAA proceedings initiated in 2012,
28 were liquidating CCAAs (64 per cent), 7 were reorganizations (16 per
cent), and 9 failed and entered bankruptcy or receivership (20 per cent).
Ontario had the most total ¿lings (30) as well as the most liquidating CCAAs
(22) over both years, followed by Alberta (18 and 10, respectively), British
Columbia (13 and 9, respectively), and Quebec (10 and 5, respectively).
Total proceedings by type, province and year of ¿ling are shown below in
Table 1.
Table 1. CCAA Filings By Type, Province and Year:
1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013
Province

Type of Filing
Sale

ALTA.

Bkptcy/Rec’p

B.C.

2012

Total Both Years

3

7

10

1

4

5

2013

Reorganization

2

1

3

Sale

4

5

9

Bkptcy/Rec’p

0

0

0

Reorganization

2

2

4

37. Olympia & York, for instance, was one of the largest commercial real estate developers in the
world when it ¿led for CCAA protection in 1992. See Re Olympia & York Developments Ltd, [1993]
OJ No 545, 12 OR (3d) 500 (Ont Gen Div) [Olympia].
38. Re Nortel Networks Corporation, (2009) 50 CBR (5th) 77 (ONSC).
39. Ibid; Olympia, supra note 37; Re Canwest, supra note 2.
40. Restructuring is a cyclical business and periods of high activity are often, if not always, sparked
by major downturns in speci¿c industries. For example, given the signi¿cant differences in the assets
and operations of companies in the forestry industry compared with those in real estate or technology,
examining only certain years of CCAA proceedings could skew the data towards companies with
speci¿c characteristics. A much longer longitudinal study would be preferable for this reason alone,
but it would require a signi¿cantly greater investment in time and resources than any quantitative
studies of CCAA cases to date.

 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO

MAN.
Province
N.B.

N.S.

ON.

P.E.I.

QUE.

TOTAL

6DOH







%NSWF\5HF¶S







5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ







7\SHRI)LOLQJ





7RWDO%RWK<HDUV

6DOH







%NSWF\5HF¶S







5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ







6DOH







%NSWF\5HF¶S







5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ







6DOH








%NSWF\5HF¶S





5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ







6DOH








%NSWF\5HF¶S





5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ







6DOH







%NSWF\5HF¶S







5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ






50

6DOH

22

28

%NSWF\5HF¶S

2

7

9

5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ

9

9

18

LL Duration of proceedings
'XUDWLRQ ZDV FDOFXODWHG XVLQJ WKH VWDUW GDWH RI SURFHHGLQJV WKDW LV WKH
GDWHRQZKLFKWKHFRXUWJUDQWHGWKHLQLWLDOCCAARUGHUDQGWKHHQGGDWH
WKDWLVWKHGDWHZKHQWKHFRXUWWHUPLQDWHGWKHCCAASURFHHGLQJV'DWDRQ
GXUDWLRQZHUHDYDLODEOHIRUDOOOLTXLGDWLQJCCAAV7KHWRWDODYHUDJH
GXUDWLRQ DFURVV IRU WKHVH FDVHV ZDV  PRQWKV ZLWK D PHGLDQ GXUDWLRQ
RIURXJKO\PRQWKV%\FRPSDULVRQWKHWRWDODYHUDJHGXUDWLRQZDV
PRQWKV IRU UHRUJDQL]DWLRQV ZLWK D PHGLDQ GXUDWLRQ RI  PRQWKV )RU
WKH  EDQNUXSWFLHVUHFHLYHUVKLSV WRWDO DYHUDJH GXUDWLRQ ZDV URXJKO\ 
PRQWKVZLWKDPHGLDQRIURXJKO\PRQWKV
LLL Total costs
7RWDOFRVWVZHUHFDOFXODWHGDVDSHUFHQWDJHRIWRWDOUHWXUQVWRDOOFODVVHV
RIFUHGLWRUV)XOOGDWDZHUHDYDLODEOHIRURIWKHOLTXLGDWLQJCCAAV
)RUWKHVHFDVHVWRWDOFRVWVDYHUDJHGURXJKO\SHUFHQWRIUHWXUQV%\
FRPSDULVRQDYHUDJHWRWDOFRVWVZHUHURXJKO\SHUFHQWIRUUHRUJDQL]DWLRQV
FDVHV DQGURXJKO\SHUFHQWIRUEDQNUXSWFLHVUHFHLYHUVKLSV FDVHV 
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iv. Returns by type of proceeding and class of creditor
Returns were calculated as percentages of the debts owing to each class of
creditors. For liquidating CCAAs, overall returns to all classes of creditors
were roughly 35 per cent of debt (based on 37 cases), with average returns
to secured creditors amounting to roughly 72 per cent (17 cases), compared
with roughly 41 per cent for unsecured creditors (8 cases). By comparison,
total returns in reorganizations were roughly 21 per cent of total debt (8
cases) with roughly 54 per cent for secureds (5 cases) and 56 per cent
for unsecureds (5 cases). For the bankruptcies/receiverships, average total
returns were roughly 30 per cent (4 of 9 cases).41

v. Entity size by procedure
Total debt was used as a proxy for entity size, with total debt of the
corporate group as a whole used for measuring size in group ¿lings.
Average total debt in liquidating CCAAs was $123,981,154, with a
median of $24,880,044 (for 46 of 50 available cases). By comparison,
total average debt in reorganizations was $348,752,998.31, with a median
of $153,253,000 (11 of 17 cases). For bankruptcies/receiverships, average
total debt was $55,578,414, with a median of $26,171,027.50 (8 of 9
cases).
4. Comments and analysis
i. CCAA sales are now the norm
The foregoing data disclose that a solid majority of CCAA proceedings
initiated in 2012 and 2013 were liquidating CCAAs—64 per cent and 67
per cent, respectively. By comparison, an earlier study by the author found
that roughly 33 per cent of CCAA proceedings between 2002 and 2012 were
liquidating CCAAs, while 31 per cent were traditional reorganizations.42 In
addition, more recently, Janis Sarra reported that 78 per cent of CCAA
proceedings initiated between 1 January 2014 and 1 November 2016 were
liquidating CCAAs.43 In short, the trend towards using the CCAA as a
mechanism for selling substantially all of the assets of insolvent debtors
appears to be accelerating, such that CCAA sales are now the dominant
form of proceeding. The data also disclose that while liquidating CCAAs
41. The data on returns to different classes of creditors in bankruptcies/receiverships were too scarce
to calculate average returns by class.
42. See Nocilla, supra note 18 at 388-389. It should be noted that this earlier study only examined
reported decisions, whereas the present study gathered the available data on all proceedings initiated
in 2012 and 2013.
43. Janis Sarra, “The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium
for Insolvency Law” in Janis P Sarra & Honourable Barbara Romaine, eds, Annual Review of
Insolvency Law 2016 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) 9.
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are still most common in Ontario, they are now routinely carried out in
provinces where courts had been reluctant to approve them in past, such
as Alberta, British Columbia and Quebec.
ii. CCAA Sales took longer than reorganizations
Interestingly, corporations that sold all or substantially all of their assets
spent more time in CCAA protection than companies that reorganized – an
average of 36 months with a median of 28, compared with an average of
33 months and a median of 23, respectively. Speed is often touted as one of
the supposed bene¿ts of liquidating CCAAs, but these results suggest that
liquidating CCAAs are, in fact, signi¿cantly lengthier procedures than full
reorganizations. This ¿nding, however, should be quali¿ed by noting that
the duration of CCAA proceedings does not necessarily reÀect the time and
resources spent on the sale process itself—for example, it is possible that
many companies simply remained under CCAA protection for extended
periods of time after selling off their assets, with minimal work done by
the monitor and legal counsel after the sale was completed. The reason for
remaining in CCAA protection in many of these cases may simply have
been to facilitate the distribution of the sale proceeds to the creditors.44
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that CCAA sales do not appear to be
faster than traditional reorganizations.
iii. Total costs were roughly comparable in CCAA sales and
reorganizations
Another supposed bene¿t of CCAA sales is that they are more costeffective than full reorganizations, partly because they can be completed
more quickly than reorganizations. Again, this assertion does not appear
to be supported in the data collected here. In fact, it appears that overall
costs, as a percentage of the returns generated by each procedure,
were roughly comparable in each type of proceeding—13 per cent for
liquidating CCAAs compared with 14 per cent for reorganizations. Of
course, this study only measured the direct costs of proceedings in the
form of monitors’ fees, legal fees and other restructuring expenses. There
may well have been signi¿cant indirect costs incurred by corporations
that underwent traditional reorganizations, such as the loss of goodwill
44. This area is ripe for further investigation in future quantitative studies of CCAA proceedings.
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the costs, durations and total returns of liquidating
CCAAs, it would be necessary to review all of the relevant records from any concurrent or subsequent
receivership or bankruptcy proceedings. Where less than all of the debtor’s assets were sold in the
CCAA proceedings, the remaining assets would be liquidated through bankruptcy or receivership, and
the sale proceeds might then be distributed to the creditors through one of those processes rather than
through the CCAA proceedings.
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and damage to relationships with suppliers and customers, that were not
borne by corporations which conducted quick sales of their assets; such
indirect costs were not tracked in this study. To the extent that a sale can
quickly transfer the debtor’s underlying business on a going concern basis
to a new solvent entity, untarnished by the insolvent debtor’s troubles
and with different management, then the business would not suffer the
foregoing indirect costs. Accordingly, there may be additional cost savings
in liquidating CCAAs that could not be tracked in this study. Nonetheless,
these are interesting results, as we might still have expected to see lower
direct costs for liquidating CCAAs because a quick sale would typically
truncate the expensive CCAA process and reduce the number of court
appearances required, thereby reducing direct costs signi¿cantly compared
with a traditional reorganization. It seems unlikely that these results can
be explained by the longer duration of CCAA sales proceedings that was
noted above; rather, a more likely explanation may be that CCAA sales
are “front-loaded” in the sense that most of the work by the monitors
and legal counsel is being done at the outset of the process. Another
explanation may be found in the fact that, as discussed below, typical
candidates for liquidating CCAAs tended to be smaller companies than
those that reorganized. In short, the CCAA remains an expensive process,
and some costs are essentially ¿xed, such that smaller businesses are likely
to incur higher costs as a proportion of the overall value of their assets and,
therefore, of the returns to their creditors following a sale, compared with
larger businesses. At all events, these data suggest that while CCAA sales
might well be completed more quickly than traditional reorganizations,
there are no signi¿cant savings in CCAA sales in terms of direct costs.
iv. Overall returns were higher in CCAA sales, but unsecured creditors
were worse off
As noted earlier, overall average returns in liquidating CCAAs were
signi¿cantly higher than in reorganizations—35 per cent compared with
21 per cent. However, this overall number masked signi¿cant differences
in terms of how different classes of creditors fared under each procedure.
Speci¿cally, in liquidating CCAAs, secured creditors enjoyed average
returns of 72 per cent of debt, while unsecureds averaged 41 per cent.
By comparison, average returns in reorganizations were 54 per cent
for secureds and 56 per cent for unsecureds. Although care should be
taken in interpreting these results due to the low numbers of cases for
which the relevant data were available, these results suggest that any
bene¿ts obtained in liquidating CCAAs Àowed to secured creditors,
whereas unsecureds were worse off compared with how they fared in
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reorganizations. Moreover, since a debtor that successfully reorganized
would exit the CCAA process and continue to operate, it might reasonably
be expected that the long-term prospects for unsecured creditors, and
especially equity holders, would be much better in reorganizations than in
liquidating CCAAs. Accordingly, although total overall returns appeared
to be signi¿cantly higher in liquidating CCAAs, there are some important
caveats to that ¿nding. Based on the admittedly limited data here, it would
seem that secured creditors fared far better in liquidating CCAAs than in
reorganizations, and to some extent this came at the expense of unsecured
creditors.
III. Implications and reform recommendations
1. Comparisons to pre-packs in the U.K. and 363 sales in the U.S.
There is an ongoing debate as to whether quick sales under section 363
of chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code45 (363 Sales) and pre-packs
under the Insolvency Act 1986 in the U.K.,46 both of which are functionally
equivalent to liquidating CCAAs in many ways, generate better returns for
creditors than traditional reorganizations.
Although the available data in the present study were comparatively
limited, the results here disclose some broad similarities in the outcomes
of liquidating CCAAs in Canada, pre-packs in the U.K., and 363 sales in
the U.S. As with pre-packs and 363 sales, liquidating CCAAs have clearly
grown in popularity. At the same time, the average total costs of liquidating
CCAAs were roughly comparable to those of traditional reorganizations. By
comparison, the costs of pre-packs in the U.K. were only modestly lower
than those of standard administrations, averaging 69.6 per cent of total
realizations, compared with 72.2 per cent for standard administrations.47
While overall returns to creditors appeared to be higher in liquidating CCAAs
than in traditional reorganizations, unsecured creditors ended up worse
off in liquidating CCAAs. Likewise, pre-packs yielded particularly poor
returns for preferred and unsecured creditors and marginally lower overall

45. 11 USC §§ 101 et seq.
46. See Alfonso Nocilla, “Asset Sales and Secured Creditor Control in Restructuring: A Comparison
of the UK, US and Canadian Models” (2017) 26:1 J Int Insol Rev 60. In a standard administration
under the Insolvency Act 1986, the insolvent debtor or the court appoints an insolvency professional
known as an administrator to manage the debtor’s affairs and operations. Interim moratoria are
then imposed on enforcement actions against the debtor while the administrator attempts to rescue
the debtor or its business. By contrast, in a pre-pack, the debtor’s senior managers negotiate a sale
of the debtor’s underlying business prior to appointing the administrator. Upon appointment, the
administrator quickly implements the pre-arranged deal and completes the sale.
47. Mokal, supra note 36 at 72, Figure 38.
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returns compared with standard administrations,48 while 363 sales yielded
lower prices than Chapter 11 plan sales, even correcting for the ¿nancial
health of the debtor companies examined.49 Lastly, pre-packs were only
marginally faster than going concern sale administrations, having median
durations of 11.8 months compared with 12 months, respectively,50 while
liquidating CCAAs actually took longer than traditional reorganizations,
with median durations of 28 and 23 months, respectively. The relative
speed of each procedure was the only signi¿cant difference in the results
for liquidating CCAAs and pre-packs, on the one hand, and 363 sales, on
the other: it is clear that 363 sales are signi¿cantly faster than full Chapter
11 plan sales, as the latter require far more steps to be completed, such as
the development of a formal plan and a creditor vote, before the sale can
be completed. Consequently, a Chapter 11 plan sale could take at least 3
months to complete, compared with mean and median durations of 82 and
74 days, respectively, for 363 sales.51
In short, the typical justi¿cations of both liquidating CCAAs and
pre-packs—namely, that they are faster, more cost-effective and more
likely to yield higher returns than traditional reorganization procedures
—were not supported by the data gathered in either Canada or the U.K.
This conclusion is particularly interesting given that the average sizes of
debtor companies differed signi¿cantly between Canada and the U.K. In
general, pre-packs in the U.K. are a SME phenomenon, while most CCAA
proceedings involve large corporations. At the same time, although 363
sales in the U.S. are clearly faster than Chapter 11 plan sales, 363 sales—
like pre-packs and liquidating CCAAs—tend to leave unsecured creditors
worse off than full Chapter 11 plans. The primary cause of lower prices
in 363 sales seems to be that the process bypasses the typical protections
that preferred and unsecured creditors possess in full Chapter 11 plan
proceedings.52 This is a common theme in 363 sales in the U.S., pre-packs
in the U.K., and liquidating CCAAs in Canada. As Sarra notes, the shift
48. Ibid at 111.
49. Anne M Anderson & Yung-Yu Ma, “Acquisitions in Bankruptcy: 363 Sales Versus Plan Sales
and the Existence of Fire Sales” (2014) 22:1 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 1 at 17.In a full Chapter 11 plan
con¿rmation process, the creditors have an opportunity to negotiate and vote upon the terms of the
proposed sale. By contrast, in a 363 sale, the terms of the sale or of the sale process are usually set by
the debtor prior to ¿ling for Chapter 11 protection, and no creditor vote occurs.
50. Mokal, supra note 36 at 13-14, Figure 4.
51. Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, “Final Report and Recommendations” (2014) at
84-86, online (pdf): American Bankruptcy Institute <abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h>
[perma.cc/C7YR-AKE4]. See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J Lubben, “Sales or Plans: A
Comparative Account of the “New” Corporate Reorganization” (2011) 56:3 McGill LJ 591 at 627
(commenting on the greater speed of 363 sales compared with liquidating CCAAs).
52. Anderson, supra note 49.
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towards sales can be explained, at least in part, by changes in debt markets
that have strengthened the position of secured creditors at the expense of
weaker stakeholders:
In Canada, a result of changes to debt markets has been that the CCAA has
become largely a senior creditors’ statute, with increasing liquidations
driven not by the local creditors of early bankruptcy legislation, but
often by foreign creditors, resulting, in some instances, in diminution of
economic activity and exit of assets. Rather than a race to assets by horse
and buggy, the rapidity of distressed debt trading and the rush to litigation
or threat of litigation is now pushing the pendulum back to a new kind of
race to the assets. Many policies that facilitated trade and the movement
of capital across borders, policies that underpinned Canada’s economic
growth, set the stage for what is occurring now. Courts are confronted
with fait accompli applications before them, in effect bypassing many
of the checks and balances of the system. Sales under these conditions
often do not have the protections built into a CCAA plan that prevent
misconduct.53

A variety of other factors help to explain the shift towards sales.
Firstly, Canada—like the U.S. and U.K.—has clearly shifted from a
manufacturing-based to a services-based economy over the past three
decades.54 In general, the shift towards a services-based economy means
that more businesses are comprised of intangible assets and highly fungible
hard assets than in the past, making going concern sales an increasingly
viable alternative to full-scale reorganizations.55 Secondly, as alluded to
above, globalisation and changes in lending practices have signi¿cantly
altered the restructuring playing ¿eld in Canada, with securitization
and collateralization having “profoundly altered the nature of debt.”56

53. Sarra, supra note 43 at 23-24.
54. Businesses in the services industry now comprise roughly 70% of Canadian GDP and employ
93% of the nation’s workforce, compared with 80% of GDP and 95% of employment in the UK
and 78% of GDP and 86% of employment in the U.S. See “Value Added by Activity” (accessed 26
August 2019), online: OECD Data <data.oecd.org/natincome/value-added-by-activity.htm> [perma.
cc/T4UJ-DQK6]; See also Statistics Canada, “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Basic Prices,
By Industry, Annual Average” (accessed 26 August 2019), online Statistics Canada <www150.
statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tvaction?pid=3610043403> [perma.cc/XL2N-YGGM] and “Five Facts
About…The UK Service Sector,” online: Of¿ce for National Statistics <www.ons.govuk/economy/
economicoutputandproductivity/output/articles/fivefactsabouttheukservicesector/2016-09-29>
[perma.cc/2QQT-QGWG]; see also Jassmine Girgis, “The Evolution of Corporate Rescue in Canada
and the United States” in Jennifer LL Gant & Paul J Omar, eds, Research Handbook on Corporate
Restructuring (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) [forthcoming].
55. That said, the fact that a company is comprised largely of intangible assets and highly fungible
hard assets does not necessarily entail a loss of going concern value: see Harvey R Miller & Shai Y
Waisman, “Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the
Twenty-First Century?” (2004) 78:2 Am Bankr LJ 153 at 192.
56. Sarra, supra note 43 at 22.
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Whereas lenders traditionally had an interest in the preservation of the
distressed debtor and its business, and were therefore more likely to
support reorganization efforts, many lenders today only “want one thing:
to get paid.”57 For lenders who are primarily interested in a quick return,
quick sales processes such as liquidating CCAAs, 363 sales and prepacks are attractive alternatives to full reorganizations. At the same time,
securitization and collateralization have contributed to the fragmenting
of many debtors’ ¿nancing structures, making negotiated workouts more
complex and challenging than in the past. Baird and Rasmussen have
suggested, for example, that it may be impossible to formulate viable
reorganization plans for some businesses because there is simply no
common ground among the different stakeholders. In other words, there
is an “empty core.”58 Quick sales, driven by the incumbent managers of
distressed debtors and supported by the senior secured creditors, may be
one solution to such deadlocks. Forcing a quick sale minimizes the time
spent negotiating with disparate stakeholder groups and provides certainty
as to the outcome of the insolvency process if negotiations fail, effectively
“putting a gun to the parties’ heads.”59
Meanwhile, debtor-in-possession (DIP) ¿nancing practices have
signi¿cantly strengthened the position of pre-existing secured creditors,
effectively giving them a “stranglehold over debtors” by permitting them
to obtain priority over all of a distressed debtor’s assets in exchange for
agreeing to ¿nance the restructuring.60 Once a DIP lender is in control, it
can impose various positive and negative covenants on a distressed debtor,
limiting the debtor’s cash Àow and establishing a strict timeframe for the
restructuring.61 The DIP lender may also insist that the debtor retain the
lender’s preferred monitor,62 change the composition of the debtor’s board
of directors, or alter the compensation and terms of employment of the

57. Jonathan C Lipson, “Bargaining Bankrupt: A Relational Theory of Contract in Bankruptcy”
(2016) 6:2 Harv Bus L Rev 239 at 289.
58. Douglas G Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, “Antibankruptcy” (2010) 119 Yale LJ 648 at 687-694:
“An “empty core” exists when three or more parties cannot reach a stable agreement with each other
because some other agreement always exists that at least one party prefers. In other words, at least one
person will always defect from any tentative agreement that might be made and, hence, none ever is
reached.” (ibid at 690 n 190).
59. Ibid 697.
60. Bish, supra note 20.
61. Wood, supra note 17 at 409-410.
62. Re Winalta, supra note 34 at para 11.
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debtor’s senior managers through key employee retention plans (KERPs).63
To be clear, there may be legitimate reasons for implementing KERPs.
In particular, KERPs can reduce a distressed debtor’s risk of losing key
employees to competitors during the restructuring process, which may be
helpful in the “chaotic” early stages of restructuring.64 However, it is clear
that KERPs may also be used to align the interests of a debtor’s senior
managers with those of the secured creditors. Powerful managers may be
able to negotiate substantial bonuses for themselves on the basis that their
continued employment is essential to the debtor, while the senior lenders
may be willing to support management knowing full well that ultimately,
the costs of the KERP will be borne primarily by the debtor’s unsecured
creditors.65 Notably, in deciding whether or not to approve a KERP, the
court will typically rely heavily upon the monitor’s opinion as to the
appropriateness of the KERP.66 Again, this points up the level of inÀuence
that the senior secured creditors and incumbent managers of distressed
debtors will be able to exercise in some cases. Particularly where the
debtor is also pursuing a quick sale, thereby limiting the ability of most
stakeholders to participate in the process, the court may have little else
on which to base its decision than the monitor’s opinion. In such cases,
careful scrutiny of the terms of the deal may be lacking when it is needed
most.67

63. See Wood, supra note 17 at 410, identifying the Crystallex restructuring as a prominent example:
Crystallex (Re), 2012 ONCA 404 at para 24, add’l reasons 2012 ONCA 527, leave to appeal to SCC
refused, 2012 CarswellOnt 11931 (SCC). The tactics of Canadian DIP lenders in these regards mirror
those of DIP lenders in the US: see Douglas G Baird, “The New Face of Chapter 11” (2004) 12:1 Am
Bankr Inst L Rev 69 at 81 and George W Kuney, “Hijacking Chapter 11” (2004) 21:1 Emory Bankr
Dev J 19 at 89.
64. Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc (Re), 2018 ONSC 6980. It is now well established that CCAA courts
can approve KERPs using their general power under section 11 of the Act to make any order that the
court “considers appropriate in the circumstances” (ibid at para 24) [Re Aralez]; See also Cinram
International Inc (Re), 2012 ONSC 3767; Grant Forest Products Inc (Re), 2009 CanLII 42046, 57
CBR (5th) 128 (ON SC).
65. Wood, supra note 17 at 410. It is also worth noting that the value in retaining the same managers
who may have been complicit in the debtor’s insolvency may be dubious, at best.
66. Re Aralez, supra note 64 at paras 26-28.
67. In extreme cases, courts have gone so far as to replace the monitor because its ability to advise the
court impartially came into question. See Nelson Education Limited (Re), 2015 ONSC 3580: “There is
no suggestion that A&M are not professional or not aware of their responsibilities to act independently
in the role of a monitor. A&M is frequently involved in CCAA matters and is understandably proud of
its high standard of professionalism. However, that is not the issue. In my view, A&M should not be
put in the position of being required to step back and give advice to the Court on the essential issue
before the Court in light of its central role in the whole process that will be considered” (ibid at para
31).
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2. Reform recommendations
Although the data set out in this article shed important light on liquidating
CCAAs, further study is needed in order to con¿rm whether the results
discussed here are statistically signi¿cant and broadly representative.
In particular, although pre-packaged sales under the CCAA are only
just emerging now, it seems likely that they will ultimately become the
dominant form of liquidating CCAA in the future. Accordingly, future
quantitative studies should examine the outcomes of CCAA pre-packs once
a suf¿cient number of these cases have been completed, so as to provide
a fuller picture of how the CCAA regime is operating. Having said this,
several reform recommendations can be made based upon these results
and the broader theoretical concerns with liquidating CCAAs raised here.
Firstly, the OSB should establish an online repository for CCAA
records similar to the one maintained by Companies House in the U.K.68
Although the OSB’s website currently provides basic information on
CCAA proceedings such as the dates of initiation of proceedings and the
names of the monitors, there is no central repository for records, nor are
the monitors’ websites, which contain the records, maintained after the
proceedings have concluded. As a result, it is often challenging to obtain
full records of CCAA cases after they have concluded, complicating
attempts to discern what is occurring in CCAA cases and to determine
whether changes are needed.
Secondly, along the same lines, the OSB should establish clearer
standards for monitors in reporting the outcomes of CCAA proceedings.
In a typical CCAA proceeding, the monitor may issue a dozen reports
or more, such that gathering useful data involves reviewing hundreds
of pages of materials. In short, regular, comprehensive data collection
for the purposes of informing policymakers would be prohibitively
expensive in terms of the time and resources required. A simple solution
to facilitate data collection would be to require the monitor to include,
in its ¿nal report, a summary of all of the actions taken over the course
of the CCAA proceedings and the key results of the proceedings. To the
extent that this approach might raise privacy and con¿dentiality issues,
the OSB could maintain the con¿dentiality of the monitor’s reports, or the
relevant portions thereof, and merely report on the anonymized aggregate
data. Alternatively, the OSB could provide access to the relevant reports
or redacted portions thereof to researchers who would be bound by
68. Companies House is the UK’s registrar of companies. Its online database of company records
includes, among other things, all documents ¿led in formal insolvency proceedings: “Companies
House,” online: <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/> [perma.cc/N2HJ-4QHB].
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con¿dentiality and non-disclosure obligations. In either case, the OSB
would have a single, central repository with easily accessible information
on the outcomes of all CCAA proceedings, signi¿cantly reducing the
costs and complications of data collection. The foregoing database would
permit larger, more detailed and likely more accurate quantitative studies
of the outcomes of different types of CCAA proceedings that would aid
policymakers in understanding how this area of the law is functioning and
evolving. At the same time, participants in CCAA proceedings will bene¿t
from a better understanding of how the regime typically affects similarly
situated stakeholders, enhancing the certainty and predictability of the
regime.
Thirdly, Parliament should consider comprehensively amending the
CCAA to address the growing trend toward liquidating CCAAs, and more
recently, pre-packs under the CCAA. Only comprehensive amendments
to the Act can properly address the issues with CCAA sales because,
as discussed earlier, the Act in its current form is still geared towards
traditional reorganisations. For example, the CCAA does not contain any
priority scheme for distributing the proceeds from liquidating CCAAs.
Parliament must consider whether to introduce a distinct distribution
scheme for the CCAA or whether to import the scheme from the BIA—
the latter would be the better approach because, as discussed earlier, a
strange asymmetry would result from imposing different schemes in
functionally equivalent processes, whereas Parliament and the courts have
clearly stated that the goal of recent reform efforts has been to harmonize
common aspects of the BIA and CCAA.69 In addition, it is unclear which
test courts should apply when they are asked to approve liquidating
CCAAs. Typically, courts will apply both section 36 of the Act and the
Soundair test, suggesting that neither test is determinative.70 Parliament
should provide needed clarity here by incorporating the relevant factors of
the Soundair test into section 36, eliminating the need for courts to apply
two distinct, though very similar, tests. Furthermore, Parliament should
consider whether further changes are needed to section 36 so as to ensure
that the basic protections for unsecured creditors and other vulnerable
stakeholders in full reorganisations remain available in liquidating CCAAs.
In particular, the condensed timelines of CCAA sales make it especially
dif¿cult for objecting creditors to successfully oppose the planned sales.
One solution would be to require prior disclosure to the relevant parties of
the terms of the proposed sale, so that those parties could seek professional
69. Century Services, supra note 11 at para 24.
70. Soundair, supra note 22.

5HRUJDQL]DWLRQV6DOHVDQGWKH&KDQJLQJ)DFHRI
5HVWUXFWXULQJLQ&DQDGD



advice regarding possible alternatives, as a precondition for seeking court
approval of the sale. Another option would be for the court to appoint
an independent accounting ¿rm, other than the monitor, to review and
provide its opinion to the court and all stakeholders on the terms of the
proposed deal. This would provide the unsecured creditors, in particular,
with an impartial expert opinion other than that of the monitor.71
Conclusion
The quantitative results set out in this article suggest that much of the
conventional wisdom about liquidating CCAAs may be mistaken. In
particular, the data examined thus far do not support assertions that
liquidating CCAAs are signi¿cantly faster and more cost-effective than
traditional reorganizations. Although more work is needed to gain a full
picture of what is transpiring in liquidating CCAAs, the results thus far
are concerning in light of the continued trend towards using the CCAA
as a mechanism to sell substantially all of the assets of insolvent debtor
companies, a procedure for which the CCAA was never designed.
As noted earlier, the structure of the CCAA still reÀects its original
purpose of facilitating compromises between insolvent companies and
their creditors, i.e., reorganizations. Rather than address the inconsistency
between current CCAA practice and the history and structure of the Act,
much of the jurisprudence approving liquidating CCAAs has contributed
to an “intentional confusing of realization and restructuring.”72 At the
same time, proponents of liquidating CCAAs have offered no evidence
that these processes are generating better results for creditors as a whole
than traditional reorganizations; on the contrary, the results disclosed here
suggest that secured creditors are bene¿tting from liquidating CCAAs while
unsecureds are worse off compared with reorganizations. Again, while
more data will need to be gathered, these preliminary results lend weight
to the concern that liquidating CCAAs may have become “a creditor’s
tool of choice for realizing on its security” rather than a true restructuring
mechanism.73 In short, proponents of CCAA sales have “conÀate[d] the
objects of the Act with the wishes of the principal economic actor,” and the

71. In the UK, for example, pre-packs can be submitted to the Pre-pack Pool, which reviews
and opines on the terms of the proposed sale. Since such reviews are voluntary, the Pool has seen
only limited use, see: “Pre-Pack Pool Annual Review 2017” (May 2018), online (pdf): Pre Pack
Pool <www.prepackpool.co.uk/uploads/¿les/documents/Pre-pack-Pool-Annual-Review-2017.pdf>
[perma.cc/4E2D-2GJE]. However, it would be open to CCAA courts to order similar reviews of the
terms of proposed CCAA sales, so as to provide the court and the creditors with a second opinion.
72. Bish, supra note 20 at 223-224.
73. Ibid at 232.
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cost of this may be worse outcomes for other stakeholders.74 As with prepacks in the U.K. and 363 sales in the U.S., there is a risk that in at least
some cases, the incumbent managers and secured creditors of insolvent
debtors will ¿nd ways of controlling the liquidating CCAA process,
maximizing outcomes for themselves at the expense of the stakeholders as
a group. As incumbent management may have been complicit in a debtor’s
insolvency in the ¿rst place, and secured creditors already possess various
other tools for realizing upon the assets of their insolvent debtors, this
seems a wholly inappropriate use of the CCAA process. Until Parliament
legislates clearer, more comprehensive rules governing CCAA sales, the
task of curbing such potential abuses of the regime will fall, as usual, on
the judiciary.

74.

Ibid. For further discussion, see Nocilla & DaRe, supra note 30.

